Abstract. We consider the problem of distributed convergence to efficient outcomes in coordination games through dynamics based on aspiration learning. Under aspiration learning, a player continues to play an action as long as the rewards received exceed a specified aspiration level. Here, the aspiration level is a fading memory average of past rewards, and these levels also are subject to occasional random perturbations. A player becomes dissatisfied whenever a received reward is less than the aspiration level, in which case the player experiments with a probability proportional to the degree of dissatisfaction. Our first contribution is the characterization of the asymptotic behavior of the induced Markov chain of the iterated process in terms of an equivalent finite-state Markov chain. We then characterize explicitly the behavior of the proposed aspiration learning in a generalized version of coordination games, examples of which include network formation and common-pool games. In particular, we show that in generic coordination games the frequency at which an efficient action profile is played can be made arbitrarily large. Although convergence to efficient outcomes is desirable, in several coordination games, such as common-pool games, attainability of fair outcomes, i.e., sequences of plays at which players experience highly rewarding returns with the same frequency, might also be of special interest. To this end, we demonstrate through analysis and simulations that aspiration learning also establishes fair outcomes in all symmetric coordination games, including common-pool games.
1. Introduction. Distributed coordination is of particular interest in many engineering systems. Two examples are distributed overlay routing or network formation [6] and medium access control [11] in wireless communications. In either case, nodes need to utilize their resources efficiently so that a desirable global objective is achieved. For example, in network formation, nodes need to choose their immediate links so that connectivity is achieved with a minimum possible communication cost, i.e., minimum number of links. Similarly, in medium access control, users need to establish a fair scheduling of accessing a shared communication channel so that collisions (i.e., situations at which two or more users access the common resource) are avoided. In these scenarios, achieving coordination in a distributed and adaptive fashion to an efficient outcome is of special interest.
The distributed yet coupled nature of these problems, combined with a desire for online adaptation, motivates using models based on game theoretic learning [8, 23, 29] . In game theoretic learning, each agent is endowed with a set of actions and a utility/reward function that depends on that agent's and other agents' actions. Agents then learn which action to play based only on their own explicitly the asymptotic behavior of the process for generic games of multiple players and actions, and b) derive conditions under which efficient payoffs are selected in large coordination games. Our main contribution is the characterization of the asymptotic behavior of the induced Markov chain by means of the invariant distributions of an equivalent finite-state Markov chain, whenever the experimentation probability becomes sufficiently small. This equivalence simplifies the analysis of what would otherwise be an infinite state Markov process. These results extend prior analysis on this type of aspiration learning schemes to games of multiple players and actions. We also specialize the results for a class of games that is a generalized version of so-called coordination games. In particular, we show that, in these games, the unique invariant distribution of the equivalent finitestate Markov chain puts arbitrarily large weight on the payoff-dominant action profiles if the step size of the aspiration-level update becomes sufficiently small. We finally demonstrate the utility of the learning scheme to network formation games, which is of independent interest, since prior learning schemes on network formation are primarily based on best-response dynamics, e.g., [3] .
While convergence to payoff-dominant action profiles in coordination games is desirable, another desirable property is a notion of fairness. In particular, for some coordination games where coincidence of interests is not so strong, such as the Battle of the Sexes (cf., [20, Section 2.3] ), convergence to a single action profile might not be fair for all agents that would probably rather be in a different action profile. Instead, an alternation between several action profiles might be more desirable, usually described through distributions in the joint action space. An example of a class of such coordination games is so-called common-pool games, where multiple users need to coordinate on utilizing a limited common resource. The proposed aspiration learning algorithm also may provide a distributed and adaptive approach for convergence to fair outcomes in such symmetric coordination games, such as common-pool games. This property is of independent interest, since it is relevant to several scenarios of distributed resource allocation, such as medium access control in wireless communications [11] .
In comparison to prior and other current work, this paper develops (and corrects) the specific model of aspiration learning in [13] beyond two player games. The paper goes on to derive specialized results for coordination games involving convergence to efficient action profiles and fairness in symmetric games. The results in [17] use a simpler finite state model of aspiration learning and are applicable to almost all games. The results in [17] establish convergence to efficient action profiles,
but as yet do not specify selection/fairness among these action profiles. The model of [2] is more closely related to the present model, but with a different definition of aspiration levels and a different mechanism to perturb aspirations. The results of convergence to efficiency in [2] extend beyond coordination games while requiring two player games and do not specify fairness/selection among efficient profiles.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines coordination games and presents two special cases of coordination games, namely network formation and commonpool games. Section 3 presents the aspiration learning algorithm and its convergence properties in games of multiple players and actions. Section 4 specializes the convergence analysis to coordination games and establishes convergence to efficient outcomes. It also demonstrates the results through simulations in network formation games. Section 5 extends the convergence analysis to symmetric coordination games and establishes conditions under which convergence to fair outcomes is also established. Finally, Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
Terminology:
We consider the standard setup of finite strategic-form games. There is a finite set of agents or players, I = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and each agent has a finite set of actions, denoted by A i .
The set of action profiles is the Cartesian product A A 1 × · · · × A n ; α i ∈ A i denotes an action of agent i; and α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) ∈ A denotes the action profile or joint action of all agents. The payoff/utility function of player i is a mapping u i : A → R. A strategic-form game, denoted G , consists of the sets I, A and the preference relation induced by the utility functions u i , i ∈ I. An action profile α * ∈ A is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if
for all i ∈ I and α ′ i ∈ A i , where −i denotes the complementary set I \ {i}. We denote the set of pure Nash equilibria by A * . In case the inequality (1.1) is strict, the Nash equilibrium is called a strict Nash equilibrium. For the remainder of the paper, the term "Nash equilibrium" always refers to a "pure Nash equilibrium."
2. Coordination Games.
2.1. Definitions. Before defining coordination games, we first need to define the notion of better reply: Definition 2.1 (Better reply). The better reply of agent i ∈ I to an action profile α = (α i , α −i ) ∈ A is a set valued map BR i : A → 2
Ai such that for any α * i ∈ BR i (α) we have
A coordination game is defined as follows: Definition 2.2 (Coordination game). A game of two or more agents is a coordination game if there existsĀ ⊂ A such that the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) for anyᾱ ∈Ā and α / ∈Ā,
i.e.,Ā payoff-dominates A \Ā ; (b) for any α ∈ A \ (A * ∪Ā), there exist i ∈ I and action α
(c) for any α * ∈ A * \Ā (if non-empty), there exist an action profileα ∈ A and a sequence of distinct agents j 1 , . . . , j n−1 ∈ I, such that
for all i ∈ {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j ℓ+1 }, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1.
A strict coordination game refers to a coordination game with the inequality (2.1) being strict.
The conditions of a coordination game establish a weak form of "coincidence of interests" and define a larger class of games than the ones traditionally considered as coordination games, e.g., [16, 27] . For example, according to [16] , one of the conditions that a coordination game needs to satisfy is that payoff differences among players at any action profile are much smaller than payoff differences among different action profiles. This condition reflects a form of coincidence of interests. Definition 2.2 (b) also establishes a similar form of coincidence of interests, but weaker in the sense that it holds for at least one direction of action change.
Note also that existence of Nash equilibria is not necessary for a game to be a coordination game.
Furthermore, if A * ⊂Ā, then Definition 2.2 can be written solely with respect to the desirable set of profilesĀ. In that case, Definition 2.2 (c) becomes vacuous since A * \Ā = ∅.
A trivial example of a coordination game is the Stag-Hunt Game of Lastly, for any Nash equilibrium profile outsideĀ, i.e., (B, B), there is a player (row or column) and an action which makes everyone worse off (i.e., Definition 2.2 (c) holds). Thus, the Stag-Hunt game satisfies all the conditions of Definition 2.2. Note finally that in some games, there might be multiple choices for the selection of the desirable setĀ. For example, in the Stag-Hunt game of Table 2 .1, an alternative selection ofĀ corresponds to the union of the action profiles (A, A) and (B, B). In that case, both properties (a) and (b) of Definition 2.2 hold, while property (c) is vacuous. In other words, the Stag-Hunt game is also a coordination game with respect to the new selection of the desirable setĀ .
Claim 2.1. In any coordination game and for any action profile α / ∈ A * ∪Ā there exists a sequence of action profiles {α k }, such that α 0 = α and α k i ∈ BR i (α k−1 ) for some i, terminates at an action profile in A * ∪Ā .
Proof. By Definition 2.2 (b) there exists an agent i ∈ I and an action α
we can repeat the same argument to generate an action profile α 2 and so on. Thus, we construct a sequence (α 0 , α 1 , α 2 , . . . ) along which the map α → i∈I u i (α) is strictly monotone. However, since A is finite, the sequence must necessarily terminate at some α k ∈ A * ∪Ā for k < |A|.
Note that whenĀ ⊆ A * , then a direct consequence of Claim 2.1 is that coordination games are weakly acyclic games (cf., [29] ).
Network Formation Games.
Network formation games are of particular interest in wireless communications due to their utility in modeling distributed topology control [24] and overlay routing [6] . Recent developments in distributed learning dynamics, e.g., [4] , have also provided the tools for computing efficient solutions for these games in a distributed manner.
To illustrate how a network formation game can be modeled as a coordination game, we introduce a simple network formation game motivated by [12] . Let us consider n nodes deployed on the plane and assume that the set of actions of each agent i, A i , contains all possible combinations of neighbors of i, denoted N i , with which a link can be established, i.e., A i = 2 Ni . Links are considered unidirectional, and a link established by node i with node s, denoted (s, i), starts at s with the arrowhead pointing to i. A graph G is defined as a collection of nodes and directed links.
Define also a path from s to i as a sequence of nodes and directed links that starts at s and ends to i following the orientation of the graph, i.e.,
for some positive integer m. In a connected graph, there is a path from any node to any other node. Let us consider the utility function u i : A → R, i ∈ I, defined by
where |α i | denotes the number of links corresponding to α i and c is a constant in (0, 1). Also,
where G α denotes the graph induced by joint action α. The resulting Nash equilibria are usually called Nash networks [3] . As it was shown in Proposition 4.2 in [4] , a network G * is a Nash network if and only if it is critically connected, i.e., i) it is connected, and ii) for any (s, i) ∈ G, (s → i) is the unique path from s to i. For example, the resulting Nash networks for n = 3 agents and unconstrained neighborhoods are shown in Fig. 2 .1. Let us defineĀ to be the following set of action profiles
which corresponds to the set of payoff-dominant networks. Note that payoff-dominant networks (if they exist) are connected with minimum number of links. Also, not all Nash networks are necessarily payoff-dominant. For example, in Fig. 2 .1(a), assuming that 0 < c < 1, all players realize the same utility, which is equal to 2 − c. This is a strict Nash network since each agent can only be worse off by unilaterally changing its links. It is also the payoff-dominant network. On the other hand, Fig. 2.1(b) is a non-strict Nash network and is payoff-dominated by Fig. 2.1(a) . The utility function (2.3) corresponds to the connections model of [12] and has been used to describe various economic and social contexts such as transmission of information. It has also been applied for distributed topology control in wireless networks [15] . Practically, it constitutes a measure of network connectivity, since the maximum utility for node i is achieved when there is a path from any other node to i.
Claim 2.2. The network formation game defined by (2.3) is a coordination game, provided the set of payoff-dominant networks is non-empty.
Proof. For a joint action α / ∈ A * suppose that an agent i picks the best reply in BR i (α) = ∅ (i.e., the most profitable better reply). Then no other agent becomes worse off, since a best reply for i always retains connectivity. Note that this is not necessarily true for any other better reply. Thus, Definition 2.2 (b) is satisfied. In order to show property (c), consider any joint action α that is a Nash network. If any one agent j 1 selects the actionα j1 of establishing "no links", then there exists at least one other agent j 2 = j 1 whose payoff becomes strictly less than the equilibrium payoff (e.g., pick j 2 such that (j 1 , j 2 ) ∈ G α ). This is due to the fact that α is critically connected. Continue in the same manner by selectingα j2 to be the action of establishing "no links", and so on. This way, we may construct a sequence of agents and an action profile which satisfies Definition 2.2 (c) of a coordination game. The condition that payoff-dominant networks exist is not restrictive. For example, if N i = I \{i} for all i, then the set of wheel networks (cf., [4] ) is payoff dominant. In a forthcoming section, we present a distributed optimization approach for achieving convergence to payoff-dominant networks through aspiration learning which is of independent interest.
Common-Pool Games.
Common-pool games refer to strategic interactions where two or more agents need to decide unilaterally whether or not to utilize a limited common resource. In such interactions, each agent would rather use the common resource by itself than share it with another agent, which is usually penalizing for both.
We define common-pool games as follows:
. A common-pool game is a strategic-form game such that for each agent i ∈ I, A i = {p 0 , p 1 , . . . , p m−1 }, with 0 ≤ p 0 < p 1 < · · · < p m−1 , and
and
This definition of a common-pool game can be viewed as a finite-action analog of continuousaction common-pool games defined in [19] . Table 2 .2 presents an example of a common-pool game of 2 players and 3 actions. Table 2 .2 A common-pool game of 2 players and 3 actions.
We call "successful" any action profile in which one player's action is strictly greater than any other player's action. Any other situation corresponds to a "failure." In common-pool games, we define the set of desirable action profilesĀ, as the set of successful action profiles, i.e.,
For example, this set of joint actions corresponds to the off-diagonal action profiles in Table 2 .2.
Moreover, the setĀ payoff-dominates the set A \Ā .
Claim 2.3. Any common-pool game is a strict coordination game. Proof. LetĀ be defined as in (2.4). Note first that for any α * ∈Ā and α ∈ A \Ā , we have
In other words, Definition 2.2 (a) is satisfied.
Moreover, note that any α / ∈Ā is not a Nash equilibrium. For any action profile α / ∈Ā , pick an agent i such that i ∈ arg max s∈I α s . Let us also assume that α i = p j for some j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m − 1}. If j > 0, then agent i can increase its utility by selecting action p k for any k < j. In that case, the utility of any other agent either increases or remains the same. If, instead, j = 0, then agent i can increase its utility by selecting action p k for any k > j. In this case, the utility of any other agent increases. Thus, Definition 2.2 (b) is also satisfied. Lastly, note that A * ⊆Ā. To check this, consider any α / ∈Ā. As the previous discussion revealed, there always exist an agent and a better reply for that agent, i.e., A * ⊆Ā. Thus, Definition 2.2 (c) is trivially satisfied.
If we imagine that a common-pool game is played repeatedly over time, it would be desirable that i) failures are avoided, and ii) agents manage to equally share the time they succeed (i.e., access the common resource). In other words, convergence to a successful state may not be sufficient. Instead, a (possibly time-dependent) solution that equally divides the time-slots that each user utilizes the common resource would seem more appropriate.
Distributed convergence to such solutions is currently an open issue in packet radio multipleaccess protocols (see, e.g., [9, Chapter 5] ). In these scenarios, there are multiple users that compete for access to a single communication channel. Each user needs to decide whether or not to occupy the channel in a given time-slot based only on local information. If more than one user is occupying the channel, then a collision occurs and the user needs to resubmit the data. An example of such multiple-access protocol is the Aloha protocol [1] , where users decide on transmitting a packet according to a probabilistic pattern. In this line of work, the action space of each user consists of multiple power levels of transmission [26] . If a user transmits with a power level that is strictly larger than the power level of any other user, then it is able to transmit successfully, otherwise a collision occurs and transmission is not possible. This game can be formulated in a straightforward manner as a common-pool game.
In a forthcoming section we provide a distributed solution to this problem using aspiration learning which is of independent interest.
3. Aspiration Learning. In this section, we define aspiration learning, motivated by [13] . For some constants ζ > 0, ǫ > 0, λ ≥ 0, c > 0, 0 < h < 1, and ρ, ρ ∈ R, such that
the aspiration learning iteration initialized at (α(0), ρ(0)) is described in Table 3 .1.
According to this algorithm, each agent i keeps track of an aspiration level ρ i , which measures player i's desirable return and is defined as a perturbed fading memory average of its payoffs throughout the history of play.
Given the current aspiration level ρ i (t), agent i selects a new action α i (t + 1). If the previous action α i (t) provided utility at least ρ i (t), then the agent is "satisfied" and repeats the same action, i.e., α i (t + 1) = α i (t). Otherwise, α i (t + 1) is selected randomly over all available actions, where the probability of selecting again α i (t) depends on the level of discontent measured by the difference u i (α(t)) − ρ i (t) < 0. The random variables {r i (t) : t ≥ 0 , i ∈ I} are independent, identically distributed and are referred to as the "tremble."
n , i.e., pairs of joint actions α and vectors of aspiration levels, ρ i , i ∈ I.
The set A is endowed with the product topology, [ρ, ρ] with its usual Euclidean topology, and X with the corresponding product topology. We also let B(X ) denote the Borel σ-field of X , and P(X ) the set of probability measures on B(X ) endowed with the Prohorov topology, i.e., the topology of weak convergence. The algorithm in Table 3 .1 defines an X -valued Markov chain. Let
denote its transition probability function, parameterized by λ > 0. We refer to the process with λ > 0 as the perturbed process.
We let C(X ) denote the Banach space of real-valued continuous functions on X under the supnorm (denoted by · ∞ ) topology. For f ∈ C(X ) we define
It is straightforward to verify that P λ has the Feller property, i.e., P λ f ∈ C(X ) for all f ∈ C(X ).
Recall that µ λ ∈ P(X ) is called an invariant probability measure for P λ if
At every t = 0, 1, . . . , and for each i ∈ I
1. Agent i plays αi(t) and measures utility ui(α(t)).
Agent i updates its aspiration level according to
where
3. Agent i updates its action:
4. Agent i updates the time and repeats. Since X is a compact metric space and P λ has the Feller property it admits an invariant probability measure µ λ [10, Theorem 7.2.3].
We are interested in the asymptotic behavior of the aspiration learning algorithm as the "experimentation probability" λ approaches zero. We say that a state x ∈ X is stochastically stable if any collection of invariant probability measures {µ λ ∈ P(X ) :
It turns out that the stochastically stable states comprise a finite subset of X which is defined next.
Definition 3.1. A pure strategy state is a state s = (α, ρ) ∈ X such that for all i ∈ I, u i (α) = ρ i . The set of pure strategy states is denoted by S and |S| denotes its cardinality.
Note that the set S is isomorphic to A and can be identified as such.
As customary, the Dirac measure in P(X ) supported at x ∈ X is denoted by δ x . The objective in this section is to characterize the set of stochastically stable states. Our main result is summarized in the following theorem: Theorem 3.2. There exists a unique probability vector π = (π 1 , . . . , π |S| ) such that for any collection of invariant probability measures {µ λ ∈ P(X ) :
where convergence is in the weak * sense.
As we show later, π in Theorem 3.2 is the unique invariant distribution of a finite-state Markov chain.
Remark 3.1. The expected asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning can be characterized byμ and, therefore, π. In particular, by Birkhoff 's individual ergodic theorem, e.g., [10, Theorem 2.3.4] , and the weak convergence of µ λ toμ, the expected percentage of time that the process spends in any B ∈ B(X ) such that ∂B ∩S = ∅ is given byμ(B) as the experimentation probability λ approaches zero and time increases, i.e.,
The proof of Theorem 3.2 requires a series of propositions, which comprise the remaining of this section.
Let P (· , ·) denote the transition probability function on X × B(X ) corresponding to λ = 0. We refer to the process {X t : t ≥ 0} governed by P as the unperturbed process. Let Ω X ∞ denote the canonical path space, i.e., an element ω ∈ Ω is a sequence {ω(0), ω(1), . . . }, with ω(t) = (α(t), ρ(t)) ∈ X . We use the same notation for the elements (α, ρ) of the space X and for the coordinates of the process X t = (α(t), ρ(t)). Let also P x denote the unique probability measure induced by P on the product σ-algebra of X ∞ , initialized at x = (α, ρ), and E x the corresponding expectation operator.
Let also F t σ(X τ , τ ≤ t) , t ≥ 0, denote the σ-algebra generated by {X τ , τ ≤ t}.
For t ≥ 0 define the sets
Note that {B t : t ≥ 0} is a non-increasing sequence, i.e., B t+1 ⊆ B t , while {A t : t ≥ 0} is nondecreasing. Recall that the shift operator θ t : Ω → Ω, t ≥ 0, satisfies X s (θ t (ω)) = X s+t (ω).
The set A ∞ is the event that agents eventually play the same action profile, while B ∞ is the event that agents never change their actions. For D ∈ B(X ) we let τ(D) denote the first hitting time of D, i.e.,
(3.1)
Proof. Assume that the process is initialized at X 0 = x = (α, ρ). Note that B t consists of those sample paths which satisfy
Therefore, we have:
and since the sequence {B t } is non-increasing, also for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, by continuity from above, we obtain inf x∈X P x (B ∞ ) ≥ ǫ n h nT0 , which proves the first claim.
Next, define the set
and note that P x (B ℓ ) ≤ P ℓ (x, D ℓ ), where P t , t ≥ 0, denotes the multistage transition probability function defined by the recursion P t = P t−1 P and P 0 = I. Thus, using the Markov property over k time blocks of length ℓ, we obtain the rough estimate
Let q 0 1 − inf z∈X P z (B ∞ ). We have already shown that q 0 < 1. Finite induction on (3.3) yields
We have
and thus using the Markov property together with the fact that X τ(D ℓ ) ∈ D ℓ a.s. on {τ(D ℓ ) < ∞}, and setting k = ℓ, we obtain
It is clear by (3.2) that inf x∈D ℓ P x (B ∞ ) → 1 as ℓ → ∞. Therefore both terms on the right hand side of (3.4) converge to 1 as ℓ → ∞, and the proof is complete.
Proposition 3.4. There exists a transition probability function Π on X × P(X ) that has the Feller property and Π(x, ·) is supported on S for all x ∈ X , and such that
(ii) If R λ is a resolvent of P , defined by
where ϕ(λ) ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0, and lim λ→0 ϕ(λ) = 0, then
Proof. For f ∈ C(X ) and x ∈ X , we have
t (B ∞ ), then using the Markov property we obtain that, for any positive t and t ′ ,
Since for any initial condition x = (α, ρ) the dynamics on B ∞ evolve according to
the continuity of f (which is necessarily uniform since X is compact) yields
By (3.5)-(3.6) and Proposition 3.3 we obtain
Therefore, the sequence {P t f , t ∈ N} is Cauchy in C(X ), · ∞ , and hence converges in C(X ).
Let ϕ(f )(x) lim t→∞ P t f (x). Then for each x, f → ϕ(f )(x) defines a bounded linear functional on C(X ). It is a positive functional since ϕ(f )(x) ≥ 0, for f ≥ 0, and if 1 denotes the constant function equal to 1, ϕ(1)(x) = 1. Then, by the Riesz representation theorem, ϕ(f )(x) is a Borel probability measure on X for each x. Denote this by Π(x, ·). Since ϕ : C(X ) → C(X ), it follows that Π has the Feller property. Also, by the definition of Π, we have
This proves (i). Next using a triangle inequality, we have for each T > 0,
Letting λ ↓ 0, we obtain
and (ii) follows by (3.7).
We can decompose the transition probability function of the perturbed process as
where ϕ(λ) is the probability that at least one agent trembles, and satisfies ϕ(λ) ↓ 0 as λ ↓ 0. Also, define the "lifted" transition probability function:
where R λ was defined in Proposition 3.4 (the equality on the right-hand side is evident by Fubini).
Similarly we decompose Q λ as
Here Q is the transition probability function induced by aspiration learning where exactly one player trembles, and Q * is the transition probability function where at least two players tremble simultaneously.
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5. The following hold,
(iii) Any weak limit point in P(X ) of µ λ , as λ ↓ 0, is an invariant probability measure of QΠ.
Proof. (i) We have
The first term on the right hand side of (3.9) tends to 0 as λ ↓ 0 by Proposition 3.4, while the second term does the same by the definition of Q λ .
(ii) Multiplying both sides of (3.8) by R λ , we have
where I denotes the identity operator. Let µ λ denote an invariant distribution of P λ . Hence, by (3.10), we have
and the second claim follows.
(iii) Letμ be a limit point of µ λ as λ ↓ 0. For any f ∈ C(X ), we havê
The first and the third terms on the right hand side tend to 0 as λ ↓ 0 along some sequence, by the weak convergence µ λ toμ, while the second term is dominated by P
also tends to 0 by part (i).
For s ∈ S let N ε (s) denote the open ε-neighborhood of s in X . For any two pure strategy states,
for some ε > 0 sufficiently small. By Proposition 3.3,P ss ′ is independent of the selection of ε. Define also the |S| × |S| stochastic matrixP [P ss ′ ].
Proposition 3.6. There exists a unique invariant probability measureμ of QΠ. It satisfieŝ
for some constants π s ≥ 0, s ∈ S. Moreover, π = (π 1 , . . . , π |S| ) is an invariant distribution ofP , i.e., π = πP . Proof. By Proposition 3.4, the support of Π is S, and so is the support of QΠ. Thus, for any sufficiently small ε > 0, QΠ(s, s ′ ) = QΠ(s, N ε (s ′ )) . Since QΠ is a Feller transition function it admits an invariant probability measure, sayμ. The support ofμ is also S, and, therefore, it has the form of (3.11) for some constants π s ≥ 0, s ∈ S. Note also that N ε (s ′ ) is a continuity set of QΠ(s, ·), i.e., QΠ(s, ∂N ε (s ′ )) = 0. Therefore, by the Portmanteau theorem,
If we also define π s μ(N ε (s)), then
which shows that π is an invariant distribution ofP , i.e., π = πP . To establish the uniqueness of the invariant distribution of QΠ, recall the definition of Q. Since S is isomorphic with A, we can identify s ∈ S with an element α ∈ A. If agent i trembles, then all actions in A i have positive probability of being selected, i.e., Q(α, (α n (α, α ′ ) > 0 for all α, α ′ ∈ A. It follows that if we restrict the domain of QΠ to S, then QΠ defines an irreducible stochastic matrix. Therefore, QΠ has a unique invariant distribution. Theorem 3.2 follows from Propositions 3.5 and 3.6. Moreover, Proposition 3.6 shows that the unique invariant probability measure of QΠ agrees with the unique invariant probability distribution of the finite stochastic matrixP .
Remark 3.2.
A similar result to Proposition 3.5(i), based on which Theorem 3.2 was shown, has also been derived in [13, Theorem 2] . The result in [13] though assumes incorrectly that the process Q satisfies the strong Feller property. Note that the proof of Proposition 3.5 does not make use of any such assumption and provides a corrected analysis for the asymptotic behavior of the aspiration learning scheme presented in [13] .
In the forthcoming sections, we demonstrate the importance of Theorem 3.2 in characterizing the asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning in large coordination games. Note that prior analysis of this type of aspiration learning, e.g., in [5, 13] , was only restricted to two player and two action games.
Efficiency in Coordination Games.
In this section, we study the asymptotic behavior of the invariant distribution π ofP in strict coordination games when the step size ǫ approaches zero. The aim is to characterize the states in S that are stochastically stable with respect to the parameter ǫ. To this end, first denoteS as the set of pure strategy states that correspond toĀ. Clearly,S is isomorphic toĀ. Also, denote by S * the set of pure strategy states that correspond to the set of Nash action profiles A * .
We define two constants that are important in the analysis:
For strict coordination games ∆ min > 0, and it is the smallest possible payoff decrease from the dominant payoff due to any deviation from the set of actions inĀ.
To facilitate the analysis we letP x andẼ x denote the probability and expectation operator, respectively, on the path space of a Markov process X t starting at x ∈ X at t = 0, and governed by the family of transition probabilities {QP t : t ≥ 0}. In other wordsP x (X t ∈ A) = QP t−1 (x, A) for any A ∈ B(X ).
Two Technical
Lemmas. Lemma 4.1 below introduces two new hypotheses. The first hypothesis corresponds to the case at which payoff differences within the same action profile are smaller than payoff differences between dominant and non-dominant action profiles. The second hypothesis corresponds to the case where each player receives a unique payoff withinĀ.
Lemma 4.1. Let G be a strict coordination game satisfying either one of the following two hypotheses: 
and for k = 0, 1 define the sets
Let also
Recall the definition of τ in (3.1) and in order to simplify the notation let τ k τ(D k ), for k = 0, 1. Note the following: Firstly, using (4.2), we obtain
Secondly, since |ρ i (t + 1) − ρ i (t)| ≤ ǫ∆ max , we obtain
It is also evident that lim sup
where d S is a metric in S. It is clear from the definition of P that if x ∈ Γ there are two possibilities:
If a profile α ∈ A \Ā is played, then ρ i decreases in value for all i ∈ I, or in other words, that
Otherwise, if a profile inĀ is played, then the sample path gets trapped in the domain of attraction ofS. This means that if x ∈Γ then P x (τ 1 < ∞) = 0, where P x is the probability measure induced by P defined in Section 3. In this case, and by (4.3), we also have
Thus, using the Markov property we obtain, with t 0 ∆min 4ǫ∆max ,
Conditioning on F τ0 and using the strong Markov property, (4.4), (4.6) and the foregoing, we obtaiñ
The result then follows by (4.5) and (4.7).
Next, suppose (H2) holds. Note that in this caseρ i ≡ u i (ᾱ) for allᾱ ∈Ā . Pick any ζ < ∆ 2 min
4∆max . As before we may suppose that agent 1 trembles. Let N * (ǫ) ⌊ ζ /ǫ∆min⌋. Letτ be the first time that an action profile in A \Ā has been played at least N * (ǫ) times. Then, at timeτ the aspiration level of the initially perturbed agent 1 satisfies:
while the aspiration level of any agent i ∈ I satisfies
For k = 0, 1 define the sets
It is straightforward to show thatPs(Xτ 0 ∈Γ) = 1. From this point on, we proceed as in the previous case.
For the lemma that follows we need to define the following constant. For each α * ∈ A * \Ā, select anyα ∈ A and {j 1 , . . . , j n−1 } ⊂ I which satisfy Definition 2.2 (c), and define
Then, for any strict coordination game G for which
Proof. Let s * = (α * , ρ * ) ∈ S * \S,s = (ᾱ,ρ) ∈S. Supposeα ∈ A and {j 1 , . . . , j n−1 } ⊂ I are the action profile and sequence of agents, respectively, corresponding to α * used in the calculation of ∆ 0 . Consider the sample paths s(t) = α(t), ρ(t) satisfying
, and α(t) = α j1 , . . . ,α jt , α * −{j1,...,jt} , for 0 < t < n. We have
By (4.8), ρ * i − ρ i (t) ≤ ∆ 0 for all i ∈ I and t ≤ n. Therefore,
for 0 ≤ t < n and hence we obtain
By (4.8), we haveρ
By (4.12), Π s(n − 1),s ≥ P s(n − 1),s . Consequently, the result follows by (4.9)-(4.11).
Main Result.
We define inductively the following collection of sets
For example, S 1 includes all pure strategy states for which there exist an agent i and an action α ′ i ∈ BR i (α) which satisfies (2.2) (i.e., makes no other player worse off) and also
Let also K denote the maximum k for which S k is non-empty, i.e., K max {k ∈ N : S k = ∅} . Such K is well-defined since the set of action profiles A is finite. , the sets S k are mutually disjoint. It remains to show that their union coincides with S. Assume not, i.e., assume that there exists s ∈ S such that s = (α, ρ) / ∈ K k=1 S k . According to the definition of a coordination game and Claim 2.1, there exists a sequence of action profiles {α j }, such that α 0 = α and α j = BR i (α j−1 ) for some i ∈ I terminates in A * ∪Ā. Let {s j } denote the sequence of pure strategy states which corresponds to {α j }. Then, for some j * we have s j * ∈ S * ∪S, i.e., s j * ∈ S 0 . Since s j * ∈ S 0 , then we should also have that s j * −1 ∈ S 1 , . . . , s 0 = s ∈ S j * . However, this conclusion contradicts our assumption that Proof. Consider the partition of S defined by the family of sets {S k } K k=0 . LetP SiSj denote the sub-stochastic matrix composed of the transition probabilitiesP sisj for s i ∈ S i and s j ∈ S j . In other words P SiSj is the block decomposition ofP subordinate to the partition {S 0 , S 1 . . . , S K }.
Similarly, we defineS * S * \S, and let PSSPSS * PS * SPS * S * denote the block decomposition ofP S0S0 subordinate to the partition (S,S * ) of S 0 . From:
we obtain πS(I −PSS) = πSPSSc = πScPScS .
By Lemma 4.1,PSSc → 0 as ǫ → 0, while by Lemma 4.2 for some positive constantδ, which does not depend on ǫ, we havePS * S1 ≥δ1. Thus,
and we obtain
Similarly, from the equation
It is straightforward to show, using Definition 2.2 (b), that for some positive constantδ, which does not depend on ǫ, we haveP S k S k+1 1 ≥δ1 for all k ≥ 0. Combining the equations above we get:
where in the last line we used Lemma 4.1 and (4.13). Thus, we have shown that π S0 → 0 as ǫ → 0.
We proceed by induction. Suppose π S k → 0 as ǫ → 0. Then,
which shows that π S k+1 → 0 as ǫ → 0. By Lemma 4.3, the proof is complete.
Theorem 4.4 combined with Theorem 3.2 provides a complete characterization of the time average asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning in strict coordination games.
Simulations in Network Formation
Games. In this section, we demonstrate the asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning in coordination games as described by Theorems 3.2-4.4. Consider the network formation game of Section 2.2 which, according to Claim 2.2, is a (non-strict) coordination game. Although Theorem 4.4 was only shown for strict coordination games, our intention here is to demonstrate that it also applies to the larger class of (non-strict) coordination games.
We consider a set of six nodes deployed on the plane, so that the neighbors of each node are the two immediate nodes (e.g., N 1 = {2, 6}). Note that a payoff-dominant set of networks exists and corresponds to the wheel networks, where each node has a single link. We pick the setĀ of desirable networks as the set of wheel networks. Note that the setĀ satisfies hypothesis (H2) of Lemma 4.1. In order for the average behavior to be observed λ and ǫ need to be sufficiently small. We To illustrate better the response of aspiration learning, define the distance from node j to node i, denoted dist G (j, i), as the minimum number of hops from j to i. We also adopt the convention dist G (i, i) = 0 and dist G (j, i) = ∞ if there is no path from j to i in G. The last graph in Fig. 4.1 plots, for each node, the running average of the inverse total distance from all other nodes, i.e., 1 / j∈I distG(j,i). This number is zero if the node is disconnected from any other node. We observe that the payoff-dominant profile (wheel network) is played with frequency that approaches one. In fact, the aspiration level converges to (n − 1) − c = 4.875 and the inverse total distance converges to 1 /15 ≈ 0.067, both of which correspond to the wheel network.
Fairness in Symmetric and Coordination Games.
In several coordination games, establishing convergence (in the way defined by Theorem 3.2) to the set of desirable statesS (as Theorem 4.4 showed) may not be sufficient. For example, in common-pool games of Section 2.3, convergence toS does not guarantee that all agents get access to the common resource in a fair schedule. In the remainder of this section, we establish conditions under which fairness is also established.
A Property of Finite Markov
Chains. In this section, we provide an approach on characterizing explicitly the invariant distribution of a finite-state, irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain. We use a characterization introduced by [7] , which has been extensively used for showing stochastic stability arguments for several learning dynamics, see, e.g., [18, 28] . In particular, for finite Markov chains an invariant distribution can be expressed as the ratio of sums of products consisting of transition probabilities. These products can be described conveniently by means of graphs on the set of states of the chain.
Let S be a finite set of states, whose elements are denoted by s k , s ℓ , etc., and let a subset W of S.
is called a W-graph if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. every point k ∈ S \ W is the initial point of exactly one arrow; 2. there are no closed cycles in the graph; or, equivalently, for any point s k ∈ S \ W there exists a sequence of arrows leading from it to some point s ℓ ∈ W.
We denote by G{W} the set of W-graphs; we shall use the letter g to denote graphs. IfP s k s ℓ are nonnegative numbers, where s k , s ℓ ∈ S, define the product
The following Lemma holds: Lemma 5.2 (Lemma 6.3.1 in [7] ). Let us consider a Markov chain with a finite set of states S and transition probabilities {P s k s ℓ } and assume that every state can be reached from any other state in a finite number of steps. Then the stationary distribution of the chain is π = [π s ], where
and R s g∈G{s} ̟(g).
Fairness in Symmetric
Games. In this section, using Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 5.2 we establish fairness in symmetric games, defined as follows: Definition 5.3 (Symmetric game). A game G characterized by the action profile set A is symmetric if, for any two agents i, j ∈ I and any action profile α ∈ A, the following hold: a) if
, and b) if α i = α j , then there exists an action profile α ′ ∈ A \ {α}, such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
Define the following equivalence relation between states in S:
Definition 5.4 (State equivalence). For any two pure-strategy states s, s ′ ∈ S such that s = s ′ , let α and α ′ denote the corresponding action profiles. We write s ∼ s ′ if there exist i, j ∈ I, i = j, such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between S and A, we also say that two action profiles α and α ′ are equivalent, if the conditions of Definition 5.4 are satisfied.
Lemma 5.5. For any symmetric game and for any two pure-strategy states s, s ′ ∈ S such that
Proof. Let us consider any two pure strategy states s, s ′ ∈ S such that s ∼ s ′ . Let also consider any {s}-graph g, i.e., g ∈ G{s}. Such a graph can be identified as a collection of paths, i.e., for some
for some L(m) ≥ 1. In the above expression, the function κ m provides an enumeration of the states that belong to the path g m . Note that due to the definition of G{s}-graphs, we should have that
i.e., the collection of paths {g m } do not cross each other, except at node s.
Let us consider any other state s ′ ∈ S such that s ′ ∼ s. Since the game is symmetric, for any graph g ∈ G{s}, there exists a unique graph g ′ ∈ G{s ′ } which satisfies
and s κm(ℓ) ∼ s ′ κm(ℓ) , ℓ = 1, . . . , L(m), for all m ∈ {1, . . . , M }. The transition probability between any two states is a sum of probabilities of sequences of action profiles. Since the game is symmetric, for any such sequence of action profiles which leads, for instance, from s κm(ℓ) to s κm(ℓ+1) , there exists an equivalent sequence of action profiles which leads from s ′ κm(ℓ) to s ′ κm(ℓ+1) . Therefore, we should have that:
for any m = 1, . . . , M , and hence, ̟(g ′ ) = ̟(g) . In other words, there exists an isomorphism between the graphs in the sets G{s} and G{s ′ }, such that any two isomorphic graphs have the same transition probability. Thus, we have π s = π ′ s for any two states s, s ′ such that s ∼ s ′ .
Lemma 5.5 can be used to provide a more explicit characterization of the invariant distribution π in several classes of coordination games which are also symmetric, e.g., common-pool games.
5.3. Fairness in Common-Pool Games. First, recall that in common-pool games we define the set of "desirable" or "successful" action profilesĀ as in (2.4). To characterize more explicitly the invariant distribution π, we define the subset of pure-strategy statesS i that correspond to "successful" states for agent i byS i {s ∈ S : α i > α j , ∀j = i} .
In other words,S i corresponds to the set of pure-strategy states in which the action of agent i is strictly larger than the action of any other agent j = i. We also defineS i∈IS i . Note that the equivalence relation ∼ defines an isomorphism among the states of any two sets S i andS j for any i = j. This is due to the fact that for any state s i ∈S i , there exists a unique state s j ∈S j such that s i ∼ s j .
Lemma 5.6. For any common-pool game, πS 1 = · · · = πS n . Proof. As already mentioned, for any i, j ∈ I such that i = j and for any state s i ∈S i , there exists a unique state s j ∈S j such that s j ∼ s i . Therefore, the setsS i andS j are isomorphic with respect to the equivalence relation ∼. Since a common-pool game is symmetric, from Lemma 5.5, we conclude that πS 1 = · · · = πS n .
Theorem 5.7. Let G be a common-pool game which satisfies hypothesis (H1) of Lemma 4.1. There exists a constant C 0 > 0 such that for any ζ < C 0 , πS i − − → In other words, we have shown that the invariant distribution π puts equal weight on either agent "succeeding," which establishes a form of fairness over time. Moreover, it puts zero weight on states outsideS (i.e., states which correspond to collisions) as ǫ → 0.
Simulations in
Common-Pool Games. Theorems 3.2 and 5.7 provide a characterization of the asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning in common-pool games as λ and ǫ approach zero. In fact, according to Remark 3.1, the expected percentage of time that the aspiration learning spends in any one of the pure strategy setsS i should be equal as the perturbation probability λ → 0 and t → ∞ (i.e., fairness is established). Moreover, the expected percentage of "failures" (i.e., states outsideS) approaches zero as t → ∞. learning. We observe, as Theorem 5.7 predicts, that the frequency with which either agent succeeds approaches 1 /2 as time increases. Also, the frequency of collisions (i.e., the joint actions in which neither agent succeeds) approaches zero as time increases.
6. Conclusions. We introduced an aspiration learning algorithm and analyzed its asymptotic behavior in games of multiple players and actions. The main contribution of this analysis was the establishment of a relation between the time average behavior of the induced infinite-state Markov chain with the invariant distribution of a finite-state Markov chain. The establishment of this relation allowed for characterizing the asymptotic properties of aspiration learning when applied to generic coordination games. In particular, we showed that over time, the efficient payoff profiles are played (in expectation) with a frequency that can become arbitrarily large. This analysis extended (and corrected) prior results on aspiration learning which primarily focused on games of two players and two actions. We further demonstrated these results through simulations on network formation games, where distributed convergence to efficient networks is of particular interest. Finally, we provided conditions under which fair outcomes can be established in symmetric coordination games where coincidence of interest among players is not so strong. For example, we showed that in common-pool games, where multiple players compete over utilizing a limited resource, the expected frequency at which the common resource is exploited successfully is equally divided among players as time increases, which establishes a form of fairness.
